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Federal Air Regulation 91.3 - Responsibility and authority of the
pilot in command.
(a.) The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the
final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.
(b.) In an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in
command may deviate from any rule of this part to the extent required to meet that
emergency.




The flight and operation of any aircraft in today's busy and complicated
airspace system requires training, skill, proficiency, and vigilance. The over-
romanticized golden age of aviation barnstorming is long gone. Thankfully one will
not hear the old aviation cliche of "kick those tires and light the
fires,"
as daring
pilots charged their aircraft into the sky.
The pilot of today, from the commercial airline captain to the recreational
general aviation flyer is constantly challenged by cockpit workload. Pilot workload
is imposed by a number of outside stimuli, including the particular aircraft being
flown (type), air traffic control (ATC), weather, terrain, pilot experience, flight
requirements, and by the pilot's own mental and physical abilities.
The purpose of this thesis was to design a portable computer- based flight
management system for general aviation pilots. The idea of Daedalus arose from
the need to ease pilot workload and to help organize the cockpit more efficiently,
thus promoting safety and reducing pilot error. The purpose of a cockpit flight
management system is to help the general aviation pilot make better decisions and
to discourage bad flying habits. In the airline industry this is known as Cockpit
Resource Management (CRM).
Daedalus integrates an E6B flight performance calculator, ROM memory,
liquid crystal displays (LCD), heads-up display (HUD), electronic pen and notepad
(personal data assistant capability), and preprogrammed data cards for each
aircraft a pilot may fly. The data cards empower Daedalus with a particular
aircraft's checklists, standard operating procedures (SOP), and emergency
procedures in a convenient format. Daedalus is then prompted by the pilot
through all phases of aircraft operation from preflight to start up, run up to takeoff,
Fig. 1-1
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climb through cruise, and finally landing and shutdown.
This familiar quotation captures the essence behind the creation of
Daedalus:
"Aviation is in itself not inherently dangerous. But to an even
greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of
carelessness, incapacity or
neglect."
(Trollip and Jensen 1 991 , x)
Pilots owe it to themselves and the passengers they fly to be as well prepared as
possible for every flight they make.
2.0 ACCIDENTS & PILOT ERROR
"Aviate, Navigate and
Communicate"
is the pilot's litany and one of the
cardinal rules of aviation that all students learn from their flight instructors.
Moreover;
"Modern aviation has at its root a three-legged premise:
Aviate, Navigate and Communicate. It is the nature of actual
flying that these elements are simultaneously experienced
and applied to the pilot. To fly is to aviate; to fly to a destination
is to navigate; and an essential factor of flying somewhere
safely is thorough communication with the air traffic control
system."
(Sadlowe 1991, 54)
Simply put, don"t get behind in flying the airplane. However, the typical general
aviation accident is usually preceded by a chain of events in which the pilot
progressively fails to stay ahead of the situation and the aircraft. Accident statistics
indicate that "more than 80 percent of the accidents in general aviation today are




, 2) Another study cites, "Human performance issues appear as





The question that we must ask now is; What is pilot error? Pilot error is
defined as:
"An action or decision of the pilot that if not caught or
corrected, could contribute to the occurrence of an
accident or incident. Inaction or indecision are included
in the
definition."











In addition, it should be noted that the term "pilot error does not imply that all errors
are the fault of the pilot. Sometimes external circumstances are the cause, such as
poorly designed instruments, controls in the cockpit, or ambiguous regulations or
communications."
(Trollip and Jensen 1991, 3)
Moreover, even though aeronautical science and technology have made
exponential gains in aircraft reliability and safety, one factor remains constant, in
that human beings have developmentally remained the same since the beginning
of manned flight. (Barnes-Svarney 1992, 43) Aviation accident statistics prove
that:
"General aviation is safe and getting safer; It's safety
record has been improving steadily for more than 50
years. The fatal accident rate has steadily declined
to less than two per 100,000 flight hours. In 1990, more








(Trollip and Jensen 1 991 , 1 3) (Landsberg 1993, 121)
However, although accident statistics continue to improve, in 1990 there were
736 fatal general aviation accidents. (Swanda 1992, 34) In addition, according to
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) which investigates, researches
and compiles accident data finds that:
"In 1985, the pilot was found to be a 'broad
cause-factor'
in
84% of all accidents, and 90.6% of all fatal accidents. This
means that the responsibility for accidents is largely the fault
of people, not the machines they
fly."
(Trollip and Jensen 1 991 , 1 3)
More precisely, "The most common, specific causes of the accidents, in order of
frequency are:
Loss of directional control
Poor judgment
Airspeed not maintained




Poor inflight planning and decision-making
As you can see, almost all of these are a result of poor pilot performance, not a
result of equipment
malfunctions."
(Trollip and Jensen 1991, 13)
Fig. 2-3 Accident Distribution by Phase of Flight
Takeoff Climb
19% I 15%













Exposure: % of Time per Phase
(Trollip and Jensen 1991, 14)














3.0 PILOT WORKLOAD, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, ERROR
CHAINS and DECISION-MAKING
"A superior pilot is one who stays out of trouble by using superior judgment to
avoid situations which might require superior
skill."
(Hamilton, 1993, 12) If pilot
performance is the main issue in aviation accidents, then our discussion must focus
on the flying individual. It must be said that the best way to prevent flying errors
and problems is to recognize them before they start.
"Since the 1950's very significant inroads have been made
into the incidence of technical failures in aircraft. Modern
aircraft are highly reliable; However, no correspondingly
dramatic improvements have been made in the human
components of the system. Within the statistics, there appears
to be a hard core of 'human
error'
accidents that is re
markably persistent. In fact, 80-85% of civil aircraft accidents
can be attributed to pilot error (Jensen 1982). And 50% of
these are a result of faulty pilot judgment (Jensen and Benel, 1977).
Never-the-less, explicit instruction in decision-making has
virtually ignored in flight training programs (Jensen, 1982).
The traditional view has been that judgment can only be
acquired as a by-product of lengthy and varied flying experience.
However, recent evidence indicates that pilots do display
better judgment after formal decision-making courses
(Buch and Diehl, 1
984)."
(Sadlowe 1 991 , 25)
Flying can be like juggling too many balls in the air at the same time; pilot
workload, situational awareness and decision-making are three worthy areas of
study in promoting aviation safety, while reducing accidents and their
consequences.
3.1 Pilot Workload
Pilot workload is defined as:
"The workload imposed by a particular aircraft and flight
mission is comprised of perceptual (visual, aural and tactile
senses), mental (cognition) and motor (musculoskeletal)
activity."
(Mohler and others 1 981 )
Pilot workload is also the product of how the pilot perceives himself and the task at
hand, achieved skill level, recent proficiency, general physical fitness and the state
of the rest-fatigue cycle, including degree of anxiety (if any), and the presence of
illness or chemical dependencies. (Mohler and others 1981) A systems point of
view can help define the criteria of human performance as it relates to completing a
task successfully. Figure 3-1 comes from RIT's own Dr. Jake Shealy, which
pictorially models system failures due to operator errors caused by excessive
workload. The model is simple, if demands on the operator exceed his workload
capacity, the result is system failure. On the contrary, if demands on the operator
are less than his workload capacity, the result is system success, and well within
the operators capacity.
Fig. 3-1


















Demands < Capacity = SUCCESS
Demands > Capacity = FAILURE
? Options of Man - Machine interface:
mar-hinp anri ask manto adapt
b~besiqn machine to fit man~~^>
In summary, subtle changes to a system can have a big effect on operator
performance. Therefore, the goal of the system designer is to reduce pilot
workload and create an environment in which there is a surplus of operator
capacity, thus increasing flying safety while reducing the potential for accident.
One must acknowledge that a pilot's flight proficiency and skill is the direct result of
his/her mental outlook and physical abilities, as well as training, time in type and
recent flight experience. Conversely, loss of proficiency in any learned skill is a
predictable result of lack of recent experience.
3.2 Situational Awareness
Along with workload, flight safety is bolstered by a pilot's situational
awareness. Situational awareness can be defined as:
"An accurate perception of the factors and conditions that
affect the aircraft and flight crew during a specific period of
time. Another way of looking at it is to think of situational
awareness as 'having the big
picture'
or 'being ahead of
the
airplane'."
(Cook and Golbey 1990, 53)
The connection between situational awareness and safety is obvious; the higher a
pilot's situational awareness, the lower his/her exposure to risk. For example, all
pilots will agree that airspace, navigation and radio (ATC) communications have
become more challenging and complex. Pilots of all aircraft have an increasing
tendency to look down into the cockpit while trying to organize competing incoming
information. However, in an attempt to monitor, collate and manage flight
information in a timely fashion, a pilot can be diverted from looking out the window
of his craft; which is obviously an unacceptable condition whenever visual flight
rules prevail. Thus, when a pilots attention and abilities are continually being
called upon with an ever-increasing amount of task (workload), there is a
8.
corresponding drop in situational awareness, which can set the stage for error.
(Cook and Golbey 1990, 57)
3.3 Error Chain Concept
It is often said, 'that one error often begets
others,'
and manned flight is no
exception to the rule; but rather, accidents are the sum of a number small errors
that can eventually pile up and result in serious consequences. What the reader
will discover is that accidents are the result of a chain of errors that once set in
motion act in a domino effect, which can end in disastrous results if not caught early
by the pilot.
"The error chain concept recognizes that 'human
error'
accidents are the result of a sequence of events that
culminate in a mishap. Seldom is one event alone
responsible for an accident or incident. Rather, a number
of events, one following another, raise cumulative
risk exposure of a flight. If a pilot is adept at recognizing
these events as they take place, he can take steps to
interrupt any potentially dangerous sequence before it
forms an unbreakable
chain."
(Cook and Golbey 1990, 54)
The prime objective of a pilot or crew members is to avoid building links into the
error chain. A loss of situational awareness can result from these nine scenarios:
1) Ambiguity exists: When two or more independent sources
of
information- - -
instruments, manuals, pilots or gauges don't agree.
2) Confusion/Empty feeling: A sense that every thing
is not quite right with
a flight
3) Unresolved discrepancies: Occurs
when there is a failure to settle
conflicts of information or opinion. (Can be a
very powerful distraction.)
4) Fixation/Preoccupation:
Often the result of distraction, can lead us to
devote our full attention to one item or event to
the exclusion of others.
9.
5) Incomplete communications: Can result from withheld information, or
opinions, or from a failure to resolve mis
understandings or disagreements.
6) Use of an Undocumented procedure: When an abnormal or
emergency situation exists, do
you know where to look in the
flight manual or checklist for
appropriate guidance?
7) Violating operating limitations or
Minimum operating standards: Either intentionally or unintentionally
involving weather, speed limitations
or altitude restrictions.
8) Failure to meet targets: Whether those targets are ETA's (Estimated Time of
Arrival.), altitudes, speeds, approach minimums,
headings or fuel reserves.
9) Departure from standard
operating procedures: Procedures which were devised to save both
pilot and aircraft.
(Cook and Golbey 1990, 56-57)
Recognizing the potential for the error chain concept is an important step in
reducing pilot error, while increasing one's situational awareness and flying safety.
3.4 Decision-making
So much of flight training is geared to teach pilots how to handle in-flight
emergencies such as engine failures or electrical system malfunctions after the
fact. However, little time is spent teaching pilots how to recognize and monitor the
existence of potential problems, which in turn could minimize the risks associated
with a in-flight malfunction that could lead to an accident. The best way to reduce
the risks of flying to acceptable proportions is to teach pilots to make
better
decisions. Moreover,
"Experience has shown that good judgment is something
10.
that can be taught. This is significant because human error
ranks so high as a principle cause of aviation accidents.
Judgment training is designed to make pilots aware of the
fact that accidents are the product of an evolving chain of
events and to understand that pilots can, to a large extent,




"Pilot decision-making is the process of recognizing and
analyzing all available information about oneself, the
aircraft, and the flying environment, followed by a rational
evaluation of alternatives to implement a timely decision
that maximizes safety. Pilot decision-making thus involves
one's attitudes toward risk-taking and one's ability to
evaluate risks and make decisions based upon one's
knowledge, skills, and experience. Pilot decision-making
always involves a problem or choice, an unknown element,
usually a time constraint, and stress. (Swanda 1992, 31)
However, what constitutes good pilot decision-making? During WWII the Army Air
Force stated; "A student showed good judgment when he was able to synthesize
all of the aspects of his flying training and produce a safe and efficient
result."
(Miller 1 947, 50) Naively, it seems fair to say that the Army Air Corps criteria of
good pilot judgment is a bit cloudy. Pilots often joke that there is no such thing as a
bad landing as long as you can walk away from it. Funny? Not really in retrospect
of accident statistics and lost lives.
The problem with pilot decision-making is that flying complexity is rapidly
approaching the limits of human capability. Interestingly;
"One very fundamental characteristic of the
information
processing system (brain) requires mention. Although man
has a vast capacity for sensing information, the decision
making stage of the process
consists of just one single
channel. In other words, although information may be sensed
from the approach lights, altimeter, the airspeed indicator and
ATC. The decision-making channel is being time-shared
between different inputs this bottleneck impedes the whole
11.
processing system (Broadbent, 1958; Poulton,
1971)."
(Hawkins 1987, 37)
The main deficiency with the human brain is that man's short-term memory is
notoriously unreliable; retrieval errors are common in which data is misplaced or
forgotten, thus setting the stage for error. For example aircraft checklists can
become a boring routine of repetitive tasks that can cause complacency and a loss
of motivation in the pilot. (Hawkins 1987, 42) Furthermore, human performance
and error rates are directly influenced by the amount of challenge and stimulation
of a task; this is known as vigilance effect.
"It has long been recognized that man's performance of tasks
requiring him to monitor or detect brief, low intensity and
infrequently occurring events over long periods of time is poor.
In 1943, the Royal Air Force (RAF) asked if laboratory tests
could be done to determine the optimum watch length for
radar operators on anti-submarine patrol, because it was
believed targets were being missed. Mackworth later devised
a test to simulate the task of a radar operator and this
represented the first attempt to explain the phenomenon
which has become known as the vigilance decrement or
vigilance effect (Mackworth 1950). The RAF had found in
Coastal Command that a marked deterioration in efficiency
occurred after about 30 minutes and this has been confirmed
many times since. Much of the research on the
vigilance
decrement has been done in laboratory studies.
These have not always been representative of the operational
environment, where many factors, not least, motivation, play a
role, so that many such studies may have little
operational
application (Smith era/., 1969). However, there have also
been many industrial studies, particularly
in Japan, and these
have generally revealed such a decrement,
although subject
to individual difference (O'Hanlon etal., 1977). Practice does

























An illustration of the kind of vigilance effect which can be expected in the performance
of passive tasks with low signal rate. This shows a notable decline in performance after about
30 minutes.
(Hawkins 1987, 41)
The decision-making process occurs directly in response to a stimulus, and
requires a person to process the information to draw a conclusion. However,
vigilance effect adds to the problem of human performance, because passive tasks
like checklist procedures erode over time along with efficiency and safety.
4.0 HAZARDOUS THOUGHT PATTERNS
Ultimately, if a machine or system fails in flight it is a human being that
invariably compensates for the malfunction. Furthermore, the pilot will play the role
of the ultimate back-up to the machine. The resulting success or failure of the pilot
to meet the situation relies on his/her understanding of the problem and his/her
ability to think rationally. Moreover, it is a pilot's mental attitude and make-up that
will determine the outcome of an event. (Gerber 1992)
Accidents occur because people are vulnerable to hazardous thought
patterns;
"Hazardous thought patterns are the result of unsafe attitudes
toward risk-taking. If a pilot is trained to recognize and apply
13.
an antidote to the hazardous thought patterns that distort the
decision-making process, the pilot will make better decisions.
The key to safety, therefore is the pilot, who can recognize and
apply the antidote to hazardous thought
patterns."
(Swanda 1992, 34)
What are the Hazardous thought patterns and their antidotes, See Fig. 4-1.
Fig. 4-1 THE FIVE ANTIDOTES TO HAZARDOUS ATTITUDES
Hazardous Attitude Antidote
Anti-Authority:




Follow the rules. They
are usually right.
Impulsivity:
I must act now, there's
Do something quickly.
no time. Not so fast. Think First.
Invulnerability:
It won't happen to me. It could happen to me.
Macho:
I'll show you. I can do it.
foolish.
Taking chances is
'm not helpless. I can
make a difference.
(Swanda 1 992, 34) (Jensen and Trollip 1 991 , 8-20)
Hazardous thought patterns are the nemesis of good decision-making. Again, it is
up to the pilot to take an honest look at himself and exorcise the hazardous
thought patterns out of his mind; the antidotes more than speak for themselves.
Therefore, we must recognize, minimize and attack errors before they start,
while ultimately understanding that pilots have many
tasks to fulfill and that errors
caught early rarely result in accidents. Pilots
must evaluate themselves honestly
14.
and understand that it is sheer stupidity to ignore one's weaknesses, and we must
realize as human beings we are bound to make mistakes. And finally:
"The illusion that it is possible to achieve error-free operation
has been a convenient concept in simplifying accident
investigations, and allocation of blame has tended to discourage
proper attention to the second prong of the attack, living with
errors, but reducing their
consequences."
(Hawkins 1987, 43)
5.0 HUMAN FACTORS & COCKPIT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
"Living with errors, but reducing the
consequences,"
is the goal of human
factors research. Since WWII, the military and commercial air carriers have spent
millions of dollars on studying the dynamics and misgivings among professional
flight crews, with the goal of reducing pilot error and flight accidents. Cockpit
Resource Management is a direct outgrowth of human factors research and study.
The following excerpt from an International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
publication captures the essence of human factors:
"Human factors is about people. It is about people in their
working environments, and it is about their relationship
with
equipment procedures and the environment. Just as
importantly, it is their relationships with other people. Human
factors involves the overall performance of human beings
within the aviation system; it seeks to optimize people's
performance through the systematic application of the
human sciences, often integrated within the framework of
system engineering. Its twin objectives can be see as
safety and
efficiency."
(Trollip and Jensen 1991, 1)
The focus of human factors research and Cockpit Resource Management
training is for all of us to recognize that
inadequate aircraft system design or
operator training can contribute to pilot
error and accidents. Furthermore, we must
recognize that inadequate design and management of
pilot tasks can contribute to
errors that lead to an erosion of system performance.
15.
5.1 Cockpit Resource Management -CRM
The basic Cockpit Resource Management concept is defined as:
"Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) refers to the
effective use of all resources to achieve safe and efficient
flight operations and is the extension of pilot judgment
to the multi-person flight crew. The primary focus of CRM
is on communication, both among those who are inside
the cockpit and those who are outside, such as Air Traffic
Control (ATC). Communication is the critical factor in
cockpit management because it is the means by which
management is carried
out."
(Trollip and Jensen 1991 , 9-2)
The primary goal of CRM training is accurate aeronautical decision-making through
effective flight crew communication. CRM trains pilots to anticipate events as
opposed to reacting to a mishap after the fact. CRM is a training concept
concerned with how well a pilot and crewmember work together as a team. The
CRM concept recognizes that crew responsibilities, coordination and teamwork on
the flight deck are to used as deterrents to human error. CRM fosters a climate in
which:
*
Individual tasks are well-defined and standardized.
*
All cockpit talent is involved in all critical phases of flight.
*
The monitoring responsibility is expressed in active
participation in the information gathering and
interpretation process.
*
The pilot-in-command maintains an atmosphere of
creative discontent, that is, every crewmember should
feel free to air his/her misgivings about the safety
of the flight in an appropriate manner.
(Bruggink 1976)
Moreover, CRM establishes a clearly understood set of ground
rules and
procedures for sharing flight
responsibilities. For example, here is a more detailed
excerpt of a U.S. Department of Transportation/Federal Aviation
Administration
16.
Advisory Circular AC120-51A on CRM training:
"b- Crew Resource Management (CRM). The application of team management concepts in the
flightdeck environment was initially known as Cockpit Resource Management. As CRM programs
evolved to include cabin crews, maintenance personal and others, the phrase Crew Resource
Management has been adopted.
(1 ) CRM now refers to the effective use of all available resources; human
resources,hardware, and information. A current definition includes all other groups routinely working
with the cockpit crew who are involved in decisions required to operate a flight safely. These groups




(iv) air traffic controllers
(2) CRM is one way of addressing the challenge of optimizing the human/machine interface
and accompanying interpersonal activities. These activities include team building and maintenance,
information transfer, problem solving, decision-making, maintaining situational awareness, and dealing
with automated systems. CRM training is comprised of three components: initial
indoctrination/awareness, recurrent practice and feedback, and continual reinforcement. Each
component must be continually renewed.
7. THE MISSION OF CRM TRAINING. CRM training has been conceived to prevent aviation
accidents by improving crew performance through better crew coordination.
8. BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRM. CRM training is based on a awareness that a high degree of
technical proficiency is essential for safe and efficient operations. Demonstrated mastery of CRM
concepts cannot overcome a lack of proficiency. Similarly, high technical proficiency cannot
guarantee safe operations in the absence of effective crew coordination.
a. Experience has shown that lasting behavior changes in any environment cannot be
achieved in a short time period, even if the training is very well designed. Trainees need awareness,
practice and feedback, and continuing reinforcement: in a word, time to learn attitudes that will
endure. In order to be effective, CRM concepts must be permanently integrated into all aspects of
training and operations.
b. While there are various useful methods in use in CRM training today, certain essentials are
universal:
(1 ) CRM training should focus on the functioning of crewmembers as teams, not as a
collection of technically competent individuals.
(2) CRM training should instruct crewmembers how to behave in ways that foster crew
effectiveness.
(3) CRM training should provide opportunities for crewmembers
to practice the skills
necessary to be effective team leaders and team
members.
(4) CRM training exercises should include all
crewmembers functioning in the same roles
(e.g., captain, first officer, and/or flight engineer) they normally perform
in flight.
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(5) CRM training should include effective team behaviors during normal, routine operations.
c. Good training for routine operations can have a strong positive effect on how well
individuals function during times of high workload or high stress. During emergency situations, it is
highly unlikely (and probably undesirable) that any crewmember would take the time to reflect upon
his/her CRM training in order to choose the appropriate behavior. But practice of desirable behaviors
during times of low stress increases the likelihood that emergencies will be handled effectively.
d. CRM is defined by the following characteristics:
(1 ) CRM is a comprehensive system of applying human factors concepts to improve crew
performance.
(2) CRM embraces all operational personnel.
(3) CRM can be blended into all forms of aircrew training.
(4) CRM concentrates on
crewmembers'
attitudes and behaviors and their impact on safety.
(5) CRM uses the crew as a unit of training.
(6) CRM is training that requires the active participation of all crewmembers. It provides an
opportunity for individuals and crews to examine their own behavior and to
make decisions on how to
improve cockpit
teamwork."
As you can see CRM is a continuous process where training in constantly being
analyzed, redesigned, developed, presented, evaluated and revised to enhance
crew safety. Again, the important emphasis in not only on the flight crew, but has
shifted to encompass the whole aviation system.
5.2 CRM and the Single Pilot
Although, CRM is regarded as an outgrowth of
multiperson crew flight training
that is geared to professional pilots, CRM is an excellent
tool which can be used in
a single pilot situation. CRM training and awareness can be
helpful to improve
cockpit management and safety for any pilot. Furthermore,
a large number of
general aviation pilots are not alone when flying; in reality they
are probably flying
with a family member, friend, another pilot,
or flight instructor. Basic CRM principles
can be used to establish teamwork and
communication between a pilot and his
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right seat passenger.
CRM has set the stage for studies that have made surprising conclusions
concerning the attitude traits of an effective pilot-in-command, which is important in
evaluating one's personal attitudes toward flying and operating an aircraft. The




Recognizes his/her diminished decision-making abilities in
an emergency.
*
Encourages other crewmembers to question decisions or
actions.
*
Is sensitive to personal problems of other crewmembers that
might affect operations.
*
Feels obligated to discuss personal limitations.
*
Recognizes the captains role in training other crewmembers.
*
Recognizes the need for the pilot who is flying the airplane to
verbalize plans.
*
Recognizes the need for a relaxed and harmonious flight deck.
*
Recognizes that the optimal management style varies as a
function of the situation and fellow crew members.
*
Stresses the captain's responsibility for coordinating cabin
crew responsibilities.
On the contrary, the ineffective pilot-in-command is one who:




- Does not recognize personal limitations due to stress or
emergencies.
- Does not utilize the resources of fellow crewmembers.
- Is less sensitive to problems and reactions of others.
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- Tends to employ a consistent, authoritarian style of
management.
- Has a flight deck that is more tense than that of a good pilot-in-
command.
- Has a flight deck reflecting far less team coordination than that
of the good pilot-in-command. (Trollip and Jensen 1991, 9-19-20)
In summary, for single pilot CRM to be successful these four objectives must
be reiterated:
"First, rules and regulations are to be followed without exception.
Second, the crew concept gives each member a well defined
operational duty. Third, there is to be a high level of safety
awareness. Fourth, experience from an operational incident
or accident is to be constructively
utilized."
(DeLacerda 1992, 26)
CRM asks the flight crew as well as the single pilot to constantly evaluate the
balance between individual capability and flight workload, while making proper
adjustments to keep the flight safe. Pilots must actively use good communication,
decision-making and organizational skills, taught by CRM training, and make them
applicable to general aviation.
6.0 CHECKLISTS
For many pilots a checkride or biennial flight review by a competent flight
examiner or instructor is a time for anxiety and stress. Biennial flight reviews are a
way to make sure pilots maintain a level of currency
and flight proficiency, while
boning-up on the Federal Air Regulations. Flying skills can erode easily
over time,
especially when a pilot fails to fly regularly. Failure to fly regularly
opens the door
for bad habits and loss of flight proficiency, which can lead to pilot error. In
Webster's Dictionary, proficiency is defined as "The state of art
of being proficient,
performing in a given art, skill or branch,
or learning with expert correctness; adept,
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Fig. 5-1
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The question we must ask now is, What can every pilot do to help keep
themselves proficient and on top of the airplane? Simply, pilots can do four things
to keep themselves proficient and flying smarter:
1 ) Buy a copy of the Aircraft's Owner's Manual. Study the airplane's flight
characteristics and and maneuvers, take-off and landing procedures, stall
characteristics, important airspeeds, emergency procedures, operating
limitations, weight and balance, etc.
2) Take a look at your logbook. Are you current? When was
he last time you flew? Flew with an instructor? With passengers? Did a
cross country flight? Are you prepared to fly to the letter of the law?
3) How good is your preflight planning? Did you check weather? Did you
do a weight and balance calculation? Have you set your own flight
minimums for winds and visibility? Do you have an alternative flight plan,
in case you have to divert enroute or at your destination?
4) DID YOU USE A CHECKLIST?
Of the four suggestions above, the most important thing a pilot can do to keep
proficient and flight safe is to us a good checklist! (Strock 1 981 )
Simply stated, "Checklists help a pilot approach an aircraft and its
systems in
a ordered, systematic and safe
manner."
(Garrison 1989, 67) Moreover;
"Checklists are guides for use is ensuring that all necessary
items are checked in a logical sequence. The beginning pilot
should not get the idea that the list is merely a crutch for poor
memory. Even the most experienced professional pilots never
attempt to fly without an appropriate checklist.
The habit of using
a written checklist for the airplane being used should be so




(Flight Training Handbook 1 980, 48)
In addition and more succinctly;
"The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident
reports for the last five years include 28
accidents in which
misuse of checklists was cited
as a cause; fully half involved
forgetting to put down the landing
gear or to retract the wheels
on amphibious floats ... The next
most common problem was
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fuel mismanagement- another checklist related
item."
(Garrison 1989, 72)
The use of a well planned checklist that is easily accessable, mountable, visible
and readable to a pilot is a valuable resource. Moreover, the cockpit checklist is
major part of cockpit protocol for all military and commercial air carrier crews;
"Under the aegis of 'Cockpit Resource
Management'
- A
rational approach to dividing the work of flying among
two or three people. Checklists are handled by 'challenge
and response'; one crewmember calls out a checklist
item, and the other performs it or verifies that it has been
performed. The checklist in effect becomes a 'Do
List'."
(Garrison 1989, 74)
The goal of CRM training and the use cockpit checklists is to enforce a systematic
approach to cockpit procedure, which raises a crews situational awareness and
level of safety.
Another advantage of using a checklist is that it allows the pilot to mentally
prepare for a procedure in his/her head before the task is to be done; thus giving
the pilot ample time to perform the task, while simultaneously raising his/her
expectation level for the correct procedural response. For example, in situations
where a pilot may be under stress due to a time constraint, it is easy to let checklist
procedures slip from memory. With the use of a checklist the pilot can consciously
avoid skipping procedures that may result in a situation that leads to pilot error and
accident.
"When you ignore a good procedure because of pressures
of time, you can find yourself in double jeopardy
- The
procedure is not done at a time when it is most needed,
and, if something goes wrong, you may be too stressed
to handle the ensuing
emergency."
(Trollip and Jensen 1991 , 2-9)
Finally there are four important reasons for using checklists. First, the use
of a
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thorough and well designed checklist is a must for any conscientious and serious
pilot. Secondly, aircraft manufacturers wholeheartedly want to see that pilots
operate their products in a safe and efficient manner. Third, accident statistics and
pilot fatalities are no joke and are a terrible reality . Fourth, why not? What do you
have to lose? Only your life!
6.1 Checklist Drawbacks
The one problem with most checklists used by today's general aviation pilots
is that pilots get so accustomed and comfortable with the checklist and aircraft they
fly that they easily miss items on the list, or fail to use it at all; which can lead to
three types of error:
"One of the most common errors recognized is failing to do
something which ought to be done such as missing an item
on a checklist. This is called an error of omission and
introduces another way errors can be classified. An error
of commission is doing something which ought not to be done.
A third kind of error in this form of grouping is the error of
substitution, which is taking action when it is required, but
the wrong action. This kind of error has lead to disaster on
a number of occasions when the pilot closed down the wrong
engine after an inflight
failure."
(Hawkins 1987, 39)
Errors of omission are obvious, like missing an item on a checklist; however, much
more insidious are errors of commission and substitution. Errors of commission
and substitution are the result of negative training transfer. Negative training
transfer can be defined "as an error that is associated with earlier training or




The problem with negative training transfer is that previous learned tasks
interfere with the learning of new tasks. Moreover, the pilot who
uses the same
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checklist for the same aircraft over and over tends to develop 'set
expectations'
and, as a result, they become oft-repeated habits.
"Flight and simulator training and the learning of standard
operating procedures (SOPs) are aimed a establishing
a pattern of habitual behavior. Because of this practice of
standardizing equipment and procedures within a aircraft,
it is also often possible for the operating habits formed on
one aircraft to be carried over to subsequent
aircraft."
(Hawkins 1987, 34)
For example, it has been said by some very simplistic flight instructors that
transitioning from piloting a Cessna 150 to piloting a Cessna 172 is just a simple
matter of "adding five knots to all the operating airspeeds", which is a gross
misrepresentation of the complexities between these two aircraft. Furthermore;
"Experience and habit, however, may not always be beneficial.
Once a certain pattern of behavior has been established,
it may be difficult to abandon or unlearn it, even when it is
no longer appropriate . . . Aircraft are believed to have crashed
from this type of human error, resulting for a reversion to an




"A characteristic of reversion is that the original experience or
habit concerned may not have revealed itself for a very long
time and the person concerned may be quite unaware of the
danger lurking just beneath the
surface."
(Hawkins 1987, 34)
And finally, the last problem with standard checklists is human motivation:
"Motivation reflects the difference between what a person can
do and what he will do in any particular set of circumstances.
A fundamental weakness in traditional forms of proficiency
checking and testing is that they generally only
show a
person's capability or capacity
under test conditions. They
do not necessarily reflect his
performance or reliability when
away from the test
situation and supervision. If the motivation
to perform a particular task is too low, then a reduced
performance with more errors can be expected. (Hawkins 1987, 34)
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A case in point: many pilots use a checklist thoroughly only when they are having a
flight review or working with an instructor. However, experience and the religious
use of an aircraft's checklist does lead to a reduction in errors and accidents.
Regardless of errors of omission, commission and substitution, the use of a
checklist will make a pilot less vulnerable to error and will lower his/her exposure to
risk.
7.0 ELECTRONIC COCKPITS AND COMPUTERS
Aviation electronics and avionics has been one of the necessary pillars upon
which technological progress has been built.
"The advanced electronic displays and controls in modern
aircraft reflect over a century of development. The evolution
has taken place not in order to make the flight deck more
comfortable or convenient as a workplace, but as a result
of two major pressures; safety and economics; between
which there is an inescapable
interaction."
(Hawkins 1987, 224)
The military and commercial aircraft transports of today are increasingly dependent
on information supplied by "glass cockpits". Glass cockpits are simply electronic
flight instruments that share a vast wealth of information with their flight crews via
cathode ray tubes (CRT). The glass cockpit of today is known as Electronic Flight
Information System or (EFIS), whose purpose is to help pilots and flight crews
optimize their decision-making abilities. Avionics architecture has moved from the
analog age into the digital age, in which aircraft operating checklists and software
are hardwired right into the aircraft and available at the touch of a pilots fingertip.
As one writer states;
"Electronic devices will not be denied, however; airlines are
now looking at electronic checklist readers, which are already
in use in business jets. Preprogrammed with a checklist, the
device reads an item (with a synthesized voice) and the
crew-
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member can press a button (or, conceivably, could even
respond verbally) when an item has been checked. Such
a system has the advantage over human operators in that
it can't forget where it is in the checklist; If it
doesn'
t get a
response within a certain period of time it starts to
complain."
(Garrison 1989, 74)
In addition, general aviation is also benefiting from the technological
advances in avionics and electronics that trickle down. As of today, general
aviation pilots can purchase and utilize Loran (Long range navigation receivers),
GPS (Global Positioning Satellite Navigation Receivers), moving map displays,
Stormscope thunderstorm avoidance Weather Mapping Systems as well as TCAS
(Traffic Collision Avoidance System radar). Moreover, with the growing use of
personal computers in the home, dedicated aviation software is becoming
available for use in getting pilot weather briefs (DUAT) and filing flight plans with
the FAA . For instance;
"In the early 1980's, improvements in processing power, graphic
capabilities, and mass marketability of personal computers
gave rise to software that depicted flight. These early flight
simulators were extremely successful and were marketed
by software vendors as entertainment. However, due to the
success of these early products and coupled with additional
advancements in microprocessor technology, the mid-to-late
1980's brought serious efforts to develop PC-based simulators
devoted to instrument flight. Due to the high cost of conventional
simulators these new products were a success within the
general aviation community. One advantage personal computers
have is the combination of the flight instruments and visual
system lie within the computer monitor or CRT display. However,
obstacles existed: (1) user interface (e.g. keyboards) did not
replicate an airplane cockpit, and (2) the FAA was slow to
recognize, acknowledge, and




"The recent development of personal computers that
are within
the budget of general aviation, suggests if properly used,
PC's
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could be utilized to provide some of the training. There is some
empirical evidence to suggest and support the training effective
ness of microcomputer-based technology in task simulation
contexts. This was demonstrated by Poleman and Edwards
(1983) who showed that a computer-aided, two-dimensional
graphics simulation can be superior to material presented in
illustrated textual manner in the transfer of cockpit procedural
skills."
(Sadlowe 1991, 14)
Finally, the development of laptop computers and their flat panel displays are
redefining the way people work. Laptop computers offer consumers mobility,
software utility, high power and compact convenience anywhere a person wants.
Interestingly, it is not surprising in some instances to see laptop computers
being used for general aviation applications, such as software linked in conjunction
with a GPS or Loran receiver to create a real-time moving map displays for pilot
navigation. However, laptops are not specifically designed with general aviation
aircraft use in mind, especially since laptops are not the easiest to mount or use
while trying to input commands at a 120 knots.
8.0 PDA's (Personal Digital Assistants)
One of the most exciting and promising developments in personal computing
in the 1990's is with the introduction of PDA's or (Personal Digital Assistants). As
Bill Evans of ID Magazine writes in his article entitled "Pen Computing; Bevond
the Mouse and Laptop.". PDA's simply are "Electronic ink manipulating
smart
paper."
(Evans 1992, 89) Another author writes that PDA's,
"Wraps advanced
hardware and sophisticated software in a portable package
that presumably
anyone can use and (Soviero 1992) Furthermore;
"Unlike full-blown computers, the PDAs are designed
as
tightly focused,
limited-purpose machines. For example,
the first shipping model will be primarily
for quick note
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taking; schematic sketching; simple letter writing; and
performing basic personal-information management




Already, companies are marketing and selling their versions of PDA's; Apple
Computer is introducing Newton (See Figure 8-1), AT&T has its Personal
Communicator, Go has Pen Point, NCR has System Notepad, Sharp has a
pen-
based OZ-9600 and PV-F1, and Sony has PTC-300 PalmTop.
The interesting fact about PDA's is that they don't us a keyboard or mouse to
operate. On the contrary PDA's use a pen-based stylus and touchscreen
technology to make data inputs. Unlike conventional PC computing;
"Pen-based computers ... are powerful tablet-like
devices that operate more like notebooks than
computers. As their name implies, you control such
computers with a special pen that the screen senses.
You write directly onto the screen, and the computer




"The computer also holds the input stylus, a cordless device
that looks like an engineering pen or pencil. The stylus
interacts with an electromagnetic field that passes across
the surface of the screen. Thus, the system can tell
where-
the stylus is and whether it is touching the
screen."
(Lindeholm 1991, 218)
The most impressive feature about PDA's is their ease of use, especially
because far more people know how to use a pencil than
know how to type.
(Linderholm 1 991 , 21 8) So, what are the other
advantages of a pen-based
notepad computer? The answer is simple: the PDA has
the ability to recognize
and learn the unique intricacies of the users penmanship
with each use and
translate it into ASCII text. For example, Go's
Pen Point uses a a handwriting
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Newton's InlelFIgenT softwore makes the dovice more akin To an as
sistant than an electronic aigomier at a personal computer. Newlan
Ifonii key phrnjej huA ai "fox
this,"
of "remind mo ol
thai,"
am)
makes simple assumptions to assist you with such taslu. For exam-
pli, say you |ai dawn a leller lo Larry, laQowed by the phrase
"farmoi
inft"
Newton will select a bosusess form tetter tram mem
ory and auTomatitaDy formal the letter with Larry's address pulled
from your election" address book. Now you want Id (ai lbs bitter?
Hook Newton op to a fax machine write "fai this lo
Larry"
an tbe
so ten, and Ibe device will automatically thura out a fax cover let
ter, lill in tbe appropriate cover briorrnotian, pall up Larry's loi
number, and sena the (ax.
Seven icon buttons located nloag tbe bottom ol the aalepod kteeo
Issue commands when you touch them wilb tbe electronic stylus.
tnrh button triggers differem functions, such as the miendnr and
phone book. While the actnal buttons may change before the product
h sold, at present they are: Who, What, When, find. Format, Send,
and teat- Press
"Who"
to aaejs your andrea book;
"What"







turns ddIei into a business letter;
"SenrJ"
hu
es o latter lo a colleague. Confused? Press
"Assist"
for help.
Touch a certain day ar week an the calender with the pen, and thot
day or week will be highlighted and esln/gcd to fnll-scrten-sue hu
osier viewing. Draw ? square, then scribble oet one comer, and that
corner is instantly erased. Or write 2 + 4 =, and the answer instant
ly appears an ibe screen
subsystem called HWX which operates in real time at 3 characters per second on
a 16-MHZ 286 processor and occupies about 100K bytes of memory; plus,
another 100K for a general purpose spelling dictionary of 100,000 words.
"HWX tolerates characters that overlap, touch, or share
strokes, and it handles inconsistent input from the same
person."
. . . "After a small amount of training, users typically
experience accuracy rates of 4 out of 5 words translated
correctly, the fifth word having an easily correctable error
(ie., a word-level accuracy of 80 percent to 90 percent)






Furthermore, Apple's PDA, Newton also has handwriting recognition software
which can also apply its recognition abilities to graphic elements drawn by the
user:
"Newt/OS is a multitasking operating system. It can have
multiple recognition functions active at the same time. This
means that you can create a drawing, using the graphics
recognition function and then annotate it with labels, using
the handwriting recognition function
- all without switching
modes. This multiple function interface for jotting notes or
sketching diagrams is as natural as using
paper."
(Ito 1992, 47)
Again, it must be reiterated that PDAs were designed with the
consumer in
mind and ease of use and user friendliness were the goals
of the designers:
"Using the system and its controls is
difficult to describe,
perhaps because it is so natural. The notebook metaphor
with tabs and a table of contents is obvious and elegant.
Just about the only concept that the
user must grasp is
that pointing the stylus at something
is equivalent to
saying 'go right to
this'."
(Linderholm 1 991 , 21 8)
Go's Pen Point uses what they call a NUI or
(Notebook User Interface), which acts
like a table of contents: (see figure 8-2)
"The notebook metaphor is Pen Point's
major organizing
interface. This interface provides a quick
reference style
of access where you can
find all the information that you
need with just a few quick taps of the
pen."
(Carr 1 991 , 21 1 )
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Fig. 8-2
Screen 1: The PenPoint
notebook user interface.
The page number is at the
upper right; tapping the pen
on it advances the notebook
to the next page. To the right
are tabs associated with
pages or sections ofthe
notebook. At the bottomis
the bookshelf; the icons
represent various PenPoint
services.
Notebook; Contents < 1>
Document Edit Create View Show Sort
t? Senska 2
D New Product Ideas 3
0 Package Design Utter 4
0 Slnrt 5
[J Widget Ire 8
0 Contact Report 9
Q InventoryCheck Id
ElFax ti
U Johnson letter 12
lNewOffice Layout 13
Q OrgChart u
U Interview Form 15
C? ABC Ltd 16
L? XYZ Ltd. 19
Q? Cunent 22
U MaplromDan... 23




C? Blank Paper 30
(J To Do. 33
[? Dona 35
Q Calendar 3;
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Furthermore,
"The Pen Point interface, common to all applications, looks
like a contents page. Tapping the appropriate icon creates
a new page. Handwriting and sketches can be mixed on
the main page and keywords jotted in the margin are
recognized and converted into 'typed
text.'
A 20 Mb
hard disk of solid state memory allows up to 3000 pages
of such notes. To communicate with the outside world,
the user places the document in the
'Outbox'
and the system




And finally, PDA's are compatible with existing computer equipment for example;
"Pen Point's standard for application distribution is 3.5
inch 1 .44 Mb MS-DOS floppy disks. Every Pen Point
capable machine has access to a 3.5 inch floppy disk
drive (either built-in, via a base station, or through
MS-
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DOS desktop PC). (Carr 1991, 221)
Therefore, each document on file is in itself like a live piece of user data that can be
transferred and made available through a multitask operating system designed
expressly for the unique needs of a user who is on the move.
In summary, it is fair to say that PDA's will play an increasing role in society,
especially in task specific jobs in which standardized forms and paperwork are
needed.
"What's the big deal about a $1000 computer that works like
a $2.00 notebook? Professionals have been asking for an
electronic notepad that allows them to create information
electronically on the go, either for immediate processing or
for use back at home base. A boon to sales forces, insurance
adjusters and the legions of form fillers, these products will





"Paul Saffo, a research fellow at the Institute of the Future
in Menlo Park,California, classifies Apple's PDA as an
information appliance. 'It's a new product category that
combines the information richness we associate with
computers with the low cost, convenience, ease of use,






In conclusion, the reader must agree that PDAs
are a new and highly
innovative product category that will evolve
and make consumers more task
efficient. PDA's will be marketed as task specific devices
in which software and
hardware technology will be expanded into
all facets of human experience and will
fill a wide range of new applications.
9.0 A PREFACE TO DAEDALUS:
The general aviation manufacturers




any new or innovative aircraft for the market, due to the incredible costs of product
liability insurance and litigation. Moreover, the general aviation aircraft
manufacturers that still produce airplanes cannot afford the huge testing and
certification costs associated with bringing safer, more efficient, technologically
advanced powerplants and airframe designs to consumers. The vast majority of
general aviation pilots are flying aircraft that are a decade or more old, aircraft
which were designed and FAA certified in the 1940's, 50's or 60's. The
technological advances made by NASA's space programs, military defense
spending , and the gains made by commercial aviation research and development
only seem to trickle down to general aviation products and aircraft; in light of the
staggering contributions that general aviation makes to the U.S. economy.
"According to the Federal Aviation Administration figures,
The GA (general aviation) network in this country enplanes
approximately 200 million passengers a year, which is three
to four times what the commuters carry and one-third the
number flown by the large air carriers. Between 1987 and
1989, GA comprised 61% of all U.S. air traffic operations,
and air taxi flights totaled another 13% ... In 1989, GA
airplanes logged 35 million hours, twice the number flown




However, although these statistics are impressive, what remains constant is the
litigation of product liability and a slumping general aviation market, one in
which
pilots are flying increasingly aged and obsolete
equipment in a complex regulatory
airspace environment. Pilots have an ever-increasing role as
information
managers, in which one must monitor and
integrate multiple sources of information,




The typical private pilot of today flies a number of
different models of general
aviation aircraft, depending on whether one is training
or taking the family or
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friends on a long cross country flight. Also, the typical pilot most likely rents a plane
from a local flying club or FBO (Fixed Base Operator), either of which can offer a
wide variety of aircraft makes and models. Although this sounds convenient, pilots
are constantly challenged by a hodgepodge of different control arrangements,
engine instruments, radio stacks, switch styles, circuit breakers, flap and power
controls, and a bevy of other non-standardized equipment that have changed on
the same aircraft from one model year to the next-not to mention flying another
manufacturers brand or class of aircraft altogether!
Furthermore, the pilot is constantly challenged by his own flight bag in an
attempt to compensate for the misgivings of aircraft design. Pilots constantly
wrestle for room in cramped cockpit space, in which sectional maps, course
plotters, E6B slide rules, airport directories, checklists, aircraft operating
handbooks, pencils, clearance notepads, flight logs and aviation headset and
intercom wires tangle one like a suffocating vine. Cockpit clutter can swiftly place
severe demands and workload on a pilot. Because of these severe demands, the
pilot is no longer the information manager flying the airplane, but increasingly
becomes a stressed and panic stricken
"firefighter"
trying to keep up with the
demands of flight. Moreover, the pilot progressively can become overwhelmed by
his/her predicament, falling behind the operation of the aircraft and setting the
stage for missed procedures and pilot error.
9.1 Daedalus: Cockpit Flight Management
System
Daedalus is a cockpit flight management system concept
in which todays
technology is employed and
dedicated to the general aviation pilot. The goal of





situational awareness and safety. Daedalus is a portable system that is adaptive
to both pilot and the aircraft being flown. Daedalus is designed to provide easy
access to informative procedural matters in a format of predictable functions that
reduce variability in task oriented situations. Daedalus is a pilot tool used to help
organize and efficiently manage the general aviation cockpit.





- Replace, substitute, or teach common sense.
- Replace experience or recurrent flight training with a competent Certified
Flight Instructor (CFI).
- Replace balanced pilot decision-making.





+ Help a pilot organize the cockpit.
+ Present material and information in a standard format.
+ Reinforce pilot training.
+ Replace many flight bag items that can clutter or distract
a pilot in the
cockpit.
+ Is a learning tool that can be used to preview
or review an aircrafts
standard operating procedures
(SOP).
9.3 Daedalus: How it Works?
As mentioned earlier, PDA's (Personal
Digital Assistants) represent a whole
new class of versatile and consumer-friendly




combined in a unique portable
package. PDA technology attempts to intuitively
adapt the machine to fit human
qualities and allows for extremely flexible
task-
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oriented applications. The concept of Daedalus is firmly grounded in this
emerging technology that PDAs have to offer. The following sub-chapters will deal
exclusively with Daedalus and will describe in detail the functions and parts of the
unit.
9.4 Pen-based LCD Display / HUD Display
The purpose of any display is to supply information that aids in the process of
enhancing human performance. A display is defined as:
"The deliberate and structured presentation of information
to the senses . . . Engineering psychology uses the term in
a much more restricted way: Displays present information
about the state of the man-machine
system."
(Stokes, Wickens, Kite 1990, 1)
Furthermore, "The purpose of a display in an aircraft is to transfer information about
some aspect of the flight accurately and rapidly from its source to the brain of the
crew member, where it is
processed."
(Hawkins 1987, 226) Daedalus utilizes two





based LCD screen that acts as a multifunctional interactive display tablet. The





(HUD) prompter, which is a dedicated task-specific line item display. Both LCD
screens work together as a unit, the main pen-based screen providing the whole
checklist picture, while the smaller HUD LCD screen provides specific line item
commands. The two screens allow a pilot to effectively cross-monitor the specific
task at hand, providing the user with system information redundancy while
reducing the possibility of errors.
The
4" x5"
inch pen-based LCD input screen is located on the main




the writing stylus and
"notebook"
flight function key (F5) to write important radio
frequencies, air traffic control (ATC) clearances, transponder squawk codes,
personal notes and any other information pertaining to the flight as it occurs. The
pen-based notebook is accessed by pressing the (F5) flight function key at any
time. The notebook is driven by internal RAM supplied by a hard disk drive, which
allows you to write, store, and retrieve important notes. The notebook function is
driven by the cordless writing stylus and the notebook user interface software and
can be turned off by pressing any other flight function keys.
The other function of the pen-based LCD notebook screen is to display the
ROM driven aircraft checklist information supplied by aircraft data cards. The
ROM-
driven aircraft checklist is cued by pressing any of the appropriate flight function
keys, which will take a user to checklists for Preflight (F1), Start-up (F2), Run-up
(F3), Takeoff (F4), Notebook (F5), Cruise (F6), Landing (F7), Shutdown (F8), and
Emergency procedures (F9). The checklist screen itself has
twenty-five lines with a
maximum of fifty characters per line in easily-read 12 point type.
The pen-based LCD input screen is used to get the "big
picture"
of the
checklist. Prompting is accomplished by pressing either of the
yellow Enter/Check
buttons. As each item is checked off, the display will tell the user to proceed to the
next item until the list ends, after which the screen will
advise the user to proceed to
the next checklist by pressing the appropriate
flight function key. The pilot can
prompt at his/her own pace, the unit does not set
the pacing of checklist tasks. The
pen-based LCD input screen can also be
manipulated by the yellow circular
four-
way cursor
control button, which is especially
helpful when utilizing the E6B flight
performance calculator. In summary, the
multifunctional attributes of the pen-based
LCD input screen allow a pilot to
pace himself/herself at a
comfortable speed that
is compatible with one's flying experience,




awareness and allowing for error-free operation and a more evenly distributed
workload.
9.5 HUD: Heads-up display
The second backlit LCD display that Daedalus utilizes belongs to the
detachable heads-up display or HUD.
Daedalus'
heads-up display allows the
pilot to mount the dedicated line item LCD display on the yoke, dashboard, or
aircraft visor with the use of a universal photo accessory adapter attachment. The
HUD is then connected to the main unit through the use of a patch cord, which
supplies it with both power and information.
The goal of HUD technology was pioneered, researched, and developed for
military use. HUD's goal is to relieve the pilot of unnecessary visual instrument
scanning by projecting relevant flight information onto the windshield of the aircraft.
In addition, "The HUD in civil aviation was conceived with the objective of easing
the transition from head-down flying for visual
landing."
(Hawkins 1987, 234)
Furthermore, HUD promotes a situation in which visual scanning is not required
between outside and inside information sources, because all pertinent information
is right in front of the pilots field of vision: Technically this concept is referred to as
parallel processing. Parallel processing attempts to foster a situation in which,
"The ability of an operator to process two or more streams
of information concurrently, this perception of motion is
carried out in this parallel with perception in fovial
vision."
. . .
Moreover, the fovial vision system is defined as;
"Being high resolution sight that is
concerned with analysis
of nature, form and patterning of
visual targets, perceived
and picked up by the fovea (in the eye structure) as opposed
to peripheral vision system that makes up 90% of our sight




contextualizing orientation cues, perceived primarily by
the peripheral
retina."
(Stokes, Wickens, Kite 1990, 9-12)
In plain english, the fovial vision of the human eye is like a high-powered
telescope, which can focus on a specific object, while the peripheral vision
component of the eye is like a camera that is focused for large panoramic visual
fields. For example, a pilot while getting a air traffic advisory from a control tower
via radio, at the same time will scan the sky using the 90% of his/her peripheral
vision looking for movement that may resemble the target plane. Once the pilot has
the traffic in sight he/she will target the object using his/her fovial vision to ascertain
the plane's speed, direction, altitude, relative position, type of aircraft, and then
initiate the proper avoidance control inputs. And finally:
"The assumption that parallel processing will increase as
proximity in the visual field is increased underlies
the
principle behind the aviation heads-up display ... It is
assumed that superimposing the near visual world should
allow parallel processing of both items of information and
reduce the need for eye movements to the instrument
panel."
(Stokes, Wickens, Kite 1990, 10)
The second "intended purpose of HUD projection is, of course to allow the pilot to
take in information from the HUD instruments without taking 'eyes-off the
outside
scene,"
(Stokes, Wicken, Kite 1990, 89) which is a definite
advantage in avoiding a
mid-air collision with another aircraft or a
run-in with mountainous terrain.
However, there are disadvantages to the
HUD concept. HUD's parallel
processing concept
can cause problems with sensory overload, in
which the field
of vision can get excessively cluttered
with electronic symbology and the outside
world. Another disadvantage of HUD is
that the human brain uses serial
processing most of the
time as it takes in and deciphers data.
"Serial processing is visual scanning
in which parts of the
environment scanned sequentially, they fall outside
the range
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fovial vision, and the eyes seek different sources of movement
and information at appropriate times. In these circumstances,
certain objects, stimuli, or events will be attended to and
others will be ignored even when neither is filtered at the
level of sensory
receptors."
(Stokes, Wickens, Kite 1990, 5-6)
Moreover;
"In particular, consistently mapped, automatically processed
stimuli may
'pull'
attention to them, and therefore disrupt the
processing of discrete stimuli that may occur more or less
simultaneously; involuntary attention shifts, which auto
matically diverts full resources of the operator into serial
processing."
(Stokes, Wickens, Kite 1990, 9)
A pilot of an aircraft in flight must process a wide range of visual and auditory
signals and material. Perceptually our minds will allocate attention to the stimuli
that is most powerful in most instances.
Of course, the HUD on Daedalus is not a costly complex information
projection device; however, it is important for the reader to be "brought up to
speed"
on the concept behind HUD. The HUD on Daedalus provides the pilot with a task-
specific message and allows the user to quickly access a checklist item line by line,
while lessening dwell time in the cockpit. If a pilot should get distracted from the
HUD, he/she can easily look down to the pen-based input screen and
cross-
reference the checklist from where he/she left off. Redundancy through cross
monitoring is the goal of
Daedalus'
HUD, which seeks to get the pilot's eyes up out
of his/her lap and puts one's peripheral vision to use.
Daedalus'
LCD display screen itself measures
4"
x 3/4", which allows for 2
lines with a maximum of 28 characters per line in 24 point type for easy reading.
The HUD LCD screen also includes a backlighting mechanism to enhance
readability in most lighting conditions. However, backlighting
is the main source of




LCD backlights off to save batteries after 30-45 seconds of inactivity.
9.6 Data Cards
Daedalus aircraft checklists operate with the use of preprogrammed data
cards.The data cards empower Daedalus with a particular aircraft's checklists,
standard operating procedures (SOP) and emergency procedures in a convenient
format. Daedalus users would need to specify year, make and model of the aircraft
being flown. Daedalus users could also conceivably have a customized data card
programmed for his/her specific aircraft checklist criteria. For redundancy and
back-up, each data card would be accompanied by a plastic laminated paper
checklist in case
Daedalus'
batteries go dead or the unit fails in-flight. Another
feature that could be added to the data card could list information pertaining to any
FAA airframe or powerplant Airworthiness Advisories that a pilot might need to
know about.






in size. Each card is clearly
labeled and is stamped with optical bar coding that will make it easy for the
manufacturer to keep track of the information supplied on the card. The data card
slips into the front of the main unit. Once the unit is powered-up, the green data
card indicator light tells the user that a good connection has been made. Another
advantage of placing the data card port facing the user is that one's body can help
keep the data card from getting knocked out of
place. Changing from one aircraft
data card to another is as simple as pushing the data card ejection button and
sliding in another
one.
9.7 E6B Flight Performance Calculator




calculator is designed to perform nineteen aviation calculations and fourteen
standard aviation conversions with a high degree of accuracy. Solving any
navigational,
weight-
and-balance, or fuel endurance problem is convenient and
fast. Using the yellow circular four-arrow cursor control button for simple menu
selection, the large easy-to-read pen-based input screen doubles as a calculator
worksheet. Information is automatically retained for future use in "chain
calculations". Advanced timer functions lets the user count up or down while timing
flight distance legs and operates independently so other calculations can be
performed. The flight calculator also performs conventional mathematical
problems. Moreover, the advantages over conventional slide rule type E6B flight
computers saves time and let's pilots get their performance values quickly, thus
freeing the flight for more pressing needs.
9.8 Power Requirements
Daedalus would come ready for operation with an alkaline battery pack of six
"AA"
batteries, producing nine volts of power. Battery life would be approximately
6-8 hours in normal use and 5-7 hours with the LCD backlight on, which is typical
for electronic devices of this size and power in today's marketplace. Daedalus
could also be run on a rechargeable battery pack of nickel cadmium batteries,
however, battery life would be approximately
2.5-3.5 hours in normal use and
about 2 hours with the LCD backlight display operating. In addition,
Daedalus
could be operated by an auxiliary power source
supplied by a nine volt cigarette
lighter adapter power cord which plugs into the
unit. The use of both battery power
and a cigarette lighter adapter offers





Daedalus was designed with pilots in mind. The vast majority are very
familiar and comfortable with using conventional pilot kneeboards. Pilot's
kneeboards offer superior comfort and utility in organizing maps, checklists,
approach plates, flight logs or other information that is pertinent to conducting a
flight. Pilot's kneeboards are available in many pilot catalogs, come in many
configurations, styles, offering different features and are priced to suit any skill
level.
The kneeboard for Daedalus is made of a combination of light weight,
durable, injection molded ABS (Acrylonitrile-Butadiene-Styrene) with a sponge
lined saddle that is economically contoured to fit the shape of the users leg. A
wide elastic nylon strap mated with a quick-snap buckle assures a secure
comfortable fit. The kneeboard is attached to the bottom of Daedalus by two
mounting screws.
Daedalus was designed to be used with a kneeboard because it is an
already acceptable method of organizing and mounting material in the cockpit.
The advantages of kneeboards are clear, they offer ergonomic flexibility for people
of all sizes, accommodate either sex, are portable, user-ambidextrous,
and don't
have to be hard- mounted in the cockpit.
10.0 MATERIALS AND MANUFACTURE.
The architecture and design of Daedalus make it a good
candidate to be
manufactured out of injection molded ABS. ABS is an
excellent choice of materials
because of its durability and ability to capture
fine surface detail. ABS is classified
as a thermoplastic resin, its properties
include:
"Basically a styrene that has








and toughness greater than normal styrene. Wide range
of formulations available, some with excellent toughness
to -60 degrees Fahrenheit; temperature resistance up to
212 degrees Fahrenheit possible; good resistance to acids,
alkalis and salt; good electrical properties. High gloss and
unlimited color range possible, including transparent. Electro
plating grade for chrome plating also available. Used for pipe




ABS is an appealing resin because it allows designers to get detailed durable
parts with injection molding. For example:
"What appearance characteristics do you associate with
hair dryer covers, telephones, pocket combs,
childrens'
toys, and stereo head phones? Most of us would list
smooth finish and high gloss, fine detail, integral color,
light weight, and comfortable feel . . . Injection molding
is to plastics materials as die casting is to non-ferrous
metals. For considerations of draft, parting line location,
undercuts, and the inclusions of as many functions as
possible in a single part, the designer can think of the
two processes interchangeably. Injection molding pro
duces parts at a high rate through the use of very
accurate, hardened steel molds that are opened and
closed, filled with molten material, and designed to
automatically eject the finished
part."
(Hoogesteger 1987, 62)
Button details for Daedalus could be made of thermoplastic rubber, in which
symbology could be printed on the parts by pad transfer printing. Daedalus was
designed for ease of assembly; construction of the unit is from the bottom up.
Ancillary electronics can be screwed or snapped into the ABS shell, and sandwich
construction with the top half completes the picture. Injection-molded parts keep
the number of parts to a minimum, make for ease of assembly and make it easy to
fasten and incorporate all internal components.
10.1 Daedalus Design Aesthetics
One of the toughest jobs a designer must face is the uncompromising task of
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balancing form and function into an aesthetically pleasing and usable article. A
truly successful design incorporates exceptional human factors in a form that is
functional, durable, user-friendly and memorable.
Daedalus'
form is one of simple asymmetry, which provides the pilot with a
clear picture of the task at hand. The asymmetrical design design allows a pilot
tactile reference on the workstation without having to look down first. The E6B
flight performance calculator's shape is round and is a metaphor of conventional
aviation slide rule calculators. Another example of a tactile cue, allows the pilot, in
the event of an inflight emergency, to slide a hand or finger up the flight function
prompt keys until he/she runs up against the yellow "Emergency
procedures"
key
(F9), which has a distinctive bump on it. The advantage of this type of tactile cue
allows the pilot to keep "head-up and eyes out the
window"
until he/she is ready to
access the Emergency Procedure information.
Important control buttons are colored in high-contrast yellow with black letters,
which allow for easy readability in a wide range of lighting conditions. Flight
function keys are arranged in a logical relationship, which starts with preflight and
ends in shutdown procedures. The overall layout of the controls provides for
optimum use and user-friendliness.
Daedalus'
software would be designed and
written to supersede miscues or prompts, if multiple buttons are being pushed at





which the software anticipates correct prompts and inputs,
thus rewarding the user
with valid output. Another goal that the
software and hardware must fulfill is that it
must allow the user to reverse any input
errors that could lead to serious
consequences. For example, if a checklist item
was skipped, or is being dwelled
upon, the software could
blink and ask the user "Are you
sure?"
All systems,
whether hard or soft, must allow for flexibility





error if safety is to be assured.






which is a touch larger
than most conventional kneeboards. However, Daedalus although mounted on a
kneeboard allows for ample air circulation for both the pilot and the unit. On the
underside of the HUD and main unit,
Daedalus'
housing is pebbled with courtesy
bumps that provide the user with sure-handed gripping power.
The overall housing of Daedalus is colored in a conservative light gunmetal
gray metallic finish. The conservative finish denotes an aesthetic of
professionalism, efficiency, separation of task, and implied ease of use. LCD data
screens are spacious and flush mounted to their respective housings for a smooth
clean finish. Parting lines are deliberate, crisp and in close tolerances of each
other. The entire design aesthetic of Daedalus seeks to meld form and function
into a attractive, tight knit, and efficient package.
11.0 CONCLUSION.
"There are Old Pilots and there are Bold Pilots,
but there are no Old Bold Pilots. Will we see





The thesis concept for Daedalus: Cockpit Flight Management System
is firmly grounded in the study of human
factors. Human factors at its most basic
level is about four things:
A) People.
B) People and their
relationships to others.
C) People in their living
and working environments.
D) People's relationships
with machines, equipment, and
procedures in the environment about them.
(Hawkins 1987, 18)
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Public attention will always be tightly focused on aviation and aircraft accidents. If
pilot error is to blame in approximately 80 percent of all aviation accidents, it is time
to study, research, and implement training programs and tools to improve pilot
performance and make flying safer. However, we must take heed in the fact that:
"Individual aspects of the flight deck should not be evaluated
in isolation. The flight deck must be seen as a system with
the liveware, hardware, software and environment as its
components."
(Hawkins 1987)
Aviation safety research must study both the human component along with the
machine in the environment in which they operate. The problem of human error
will never leave the human race; remembering 'lo be human is to
err,"
but failure
to learn from one's mistakes only compounds suffering and unsafe attitudes.
"In aviation, experience is the result of non-fatal mistakes!
And that's true, we all make mistakes. The point is that an
experienced pilot has corrected his errors before they
killed him; time after time, but he doesn't make the same
mistake
twice."
(Assenheim and Bell 1990, 112)
In addition:
"Until the airman, who naturally is subject to human error,
is no longer the determining factor, the utmost in depend
ability and safety cannot be assured. In the
final analysis,
no matter how much engineering talent has been applied
to the development of an air transport as a machine alone,
the aircraft is safe and dependable only to the degree that
its control does not exceed the abilities of the pilots who fly
it."
(McFarland 1946, 1)
The nucleus of aviation safety is quite simple, a
problem that is recognized
and dealt with early by a pilot or crewmember rarely
results in a error or accident.
Daedalus seeks to format aircraft procedures and
checklists into a predictable
system that reduces pilot workload, while enhancing
one's situational awareness,
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decision-making, and overall safety. Again, it is important to reiterate the the thesis
statement that lead to the Daedalus concept:
"The purpose of this thesis was to design a portable computer
based flight management system for general aviation pilots.
The idea of Daedalus arose from the need to ease pilot
workload and help organize the cockpit more efficiently, thus
promoting safety and reducing pilot
error."
And on a final note:
"Eddie Rickenbacher, America's top Ace in WWI and
later founder of Eastern Airlines, once said. . .When
I fly on one of my airliners now, I sit back with the
passengers. But I like to look around the cabin and
observe the passengers. I see a little old lady who
is nervous and fidgeting around, and I can see that she
is a first time air traveler; Then I see a businessman
with his briefcase open working on his papers, and he
is obviously a seasoned air traveler; Then I look down
the aisle and see a man passionately chewing, gnawing,
and biting his fingernails off; that tells me that man's a
pilot! And he's not in
control!"
(Assenheim and Bell 1990, 112)
In summary, Daedalus is a product concept whose time has come. Pilots should
stop "gnawing at their
fingers"
worrying about being in control; the technology
exists to put the pilot in greater command of his destiny and aircraft by flying
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Appendix A / 69.
Fig. A-3
Fig. B-1
Appendix B: AOPA's 1993 Aviation Fact Card
AOMS1993AVIATION FACTCARD
'
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
421 AviationWay/Frederick, Maryland 21701
[M. '"'*;'> 301/695-2000 or 800/USA-AOPA
Primary Sources of data include the Federal Aviation Administration, the National
Transportation Safety Board, the General AviationManufacturersAssociation.




Held 692,095 1000 10,931 1000
Sludent 120.203 17 4 14.501 35 4
Recreational 161 15
Private 293.306 42 4 17.514 42 8
Commercial 146365 21 4 5.652 138
ATP 112.167 16 7 2.306 56
Helicopter (only) 9 660 1 4 307 OB
Glider
(only)"
8033 1 2 634 1 5
Flight Instructor 69.209 10 0
Instrument Rated 303.193 43 6
Helicopler (loial) 32 605 4 7
Glider (total! 19.570 2 8
NorvPilol
Certificates Held 517.462 1000 10.324
Mechanic 366.39? 70 8 3.901
Parachute Rigger 7.916 1 5 363
Ground Instructor 70.066 135 3,952
Dispatcher 11.607 22 852
Flight Navigato' 1.225 02 0






5 9o ol all pilots are women
"
Medical examinalions nol required, totals represent
only ptlois who have a current
medical and have no
olher pilot certilicale





























































































With Electrical System 189,942
Without Electrical System 8.533
VHF Communications
360 Channel Fixed 65,787
720 Channel Fixed 1 38.829
No VHF Communication 16.887
Transponder Equipment
Mode A Transponder 13.176
Mode C Transponder 163.100
Mode S Transponder 1.174








100 Channel Fixed VOR 52,128





Loran C (VFR only) 84,735

















Hours Flown (Millions) 47 3
General Aviation 30 1
Air
earner" 17.2
Miles Flown (Millions) 9.048.1































































Includes U S scheduled and unscheduled Part 121
and Pan 135 operators
"
Includes U S. scheduled and unscheduled Part 121
operators and scheduled Part 135 operators
"
Based on 2 5 passengers per general aviation
departure.
"










(Preliminary Data at otSptemb*i'l0, 1992)
Airports 12904 73 4
Total Transportation caia|,
FataMn %
es 43,631 100 0
Hehporls 4 199 23 9













Publicly Owned 5090 29 0
Other
'
Pnvalely Owned 12.491 " 71 0
14
Public Use 5 551 31 6 CIVIL AVIATION ACCIDENT DATA
Limited Use 12.030 _ 68 4 'Preliminary
Data at of January 17 1992)
Total %
Airline-served 666 1000 3 8
Tola' Accidenis 2276 1000
Scheduled 388 583 2 2
Genera) Aviation 2.143 94 2





Tolal Falal Accidenis 4S2 100 0
Less than 3.000 fi 11.823 67 2





and 5.999 ft 4.807 27 3
Between 6.000 tl
Totai Fatalities 942 1000
and 9.999 ft 715 4 1
General Aviation 746 79 2





Facilities Abandoned 387 100 0
Total Fatal
Public Use 38 9 8
Accldem* Accidenla
Limited Use 349 902 -








TEN BUSIEST U.S. AIRPORTS (FY) Air
Carner'
0 77 0 22
Total General Aviation
Airport Operetloni Operation. % Rate per 100,000
Chicago O'Hare 808 759 30.577 38
Departures*"
3 89 0 77
Daiias/Fi Wonh 731.070 15.860 22 General Aviation a at 086
Los Angeles Inl'l 660.680 53.371 8 1 Air
Carrier'
1 27 036
Allanla Inl'l 639.698 19.160 30
Santa Ana 550 602 453,762 82 4
'
Includes air earner (scheduled and unscheduled)
Van Nuys 511.281 510.281 998 commuter and air taxi accident data
Phoenix Sky Harbor 499 157 117.B57 23 6
**
Based on NTSB eslimated data [30 76 million hours
Denver Siapieton 491.275 34 058 69 tlown by Part 91 operators and 17 20 million hours
Miami Int'l 481 709 73.200 152 flown by Ihe air earners)
Long Beach 461.244 427.214 92 6
""
Based on FAA (48 0 million general aviation
departures) and NTSB estimated data (10 5 million
AERONAUTICAL FACILITIES
1 Centers 24
air earner and scheduled commuter departures
Air Route Traffic Conlr




VFR Towers ESTIMATED 1992 DATA
Cerap'Tracon Tow 9rs 4
Total %
Radar Approach Control Facilities 240
Pilot Certificates Held 699 800 1000
Student 121.500 174
Inslrumenl Landing Facilities 188 Private 293.300 41 9
Full ILS 928 Commercial 150.600 21 5
Pan.ai ILS 204 ATP 115800 16 5
Localizer Directional Aid (LDA) 21
Instrumem Rated 306.800 43 6
Microwave Landing System (MLS; 5
Simplified Directional Facility (SDF) 30
Active General Aviaiion






Nondirecironai Beacons (NDBs) .325 Piston Multiengine 21.200 10 7
Turboprop 5000 2 5
Oirection Finders (DFs 116
Turboiel 4.500 23
Flight Service Stations (FSSs) 175
General Aviation Hours
International Flight Service Stations (IFSSs) 3 Flown (Millions) 29 9 ~
THE PAST1981, 1986, vs. 1991
Pilot Certrficaies Held
Active General Aviation Aircraft
General Aviation Aircraft Shipments
Total Aircrafi Landing Facilrties
Public-use Landing Facilities







Revised downward by the FAA about 7% to reflect new FAA
estimation procedures used to produce 1991
X Change
1981 19M 1991 from 1981




9.457 1.495 1,021 -69 2
15.476 16,582 17,581 136
6 290 5.775 5551 .11 7
J0 7 31
8'
30 1 -26 0
3500 2576 2 143 38 8
654 473 A\a 36 7
1 262 965 746 -41 8
l data is preliminary
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